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arely  do  authors  place  between  two
  covers  their  thoughts  on  the  law,  both 
common  and  canon;  on  Rome  and  the 
British navy; on hunters and gatherers and 
tribal  societies;  and  on  the  Whigs  in  eigh-
teenth century England and the Democrats 
in nineteenth century America. Nor are many 
  scholars  willing  to  offer  “A  Conceptual 
Framework  for  Interpreting  Recorded 
Human  History.”  In  Violence  and  Social 
Orders:  A  Conceptual  Framework  for 
Interpreting  Recorded  Human  History 
(Cambridge University Press 2009), Douglass 
North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast dem-
onstrate the learning and exhibit the chutzpah 
to do both. 
Violence and Social Orders can be read 
either as a work on economic history or as 
a contribution to the study of development. 
Viewed either way, it imparts a central les-
son:  that  politics—and,  in  particular,  the 
use of coercion—determines the quality of 
life to which people can aspire: the level of 
prosperity, the degree of security, and the 
ranges within which they vary. Because of 
differences in the manner in which power 
is deployed, they argue, some societies col-
lapse in response to shocks whereas others 
prove adaptive. Over time, those that grow 
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for  longer  periods  and  collapse  less  fre-
quently achieve higher levels of income.
Throughout  history,  the  powerful  have 
tried  to  combine  in  order  to  create  rents 
and to restrict access to them—this is the 
“natural state,” North, Wallis, and Weingast 
argue,  or  the  conventional  use  of  power. 
But, in a few societies, there is “open entry” 
and,  when  combined  with  other  features, 
these  are  the  few  that  develop.  Among 
the key factors distinguishing “open entry” 
from  “natural”  societies,  two  receive  spe-
cial emphasis: the existence of impersonal 
norms and the emergence of permanently 
lived  organizations.  The   rst  facilitates 
the  circulation  of  elites:  all  who  perform 
are  entitled  to  be  rewarded.  The  second 
ampli es the impact of the  rst while also 
ensuring continuity: because organizations 
possess  more  clout  than  individuals,  they 
enable citizens to exert in uence even when 
not holding of ce and, because the lifetime 
of an organization exceeds that of its mem-
bers, organizations provide stability where 
one  might  otherwise  expect   ux  resulting 
from the impact of faction.
Two other differences stand out. In natu-
ral societies, wealth and power are held by 
the same people and they are armed. Under 
such  circumstances,  politics  resembles  a 
temporary truce in which small deviations 
can  trigger  violent  and  costly  reprisals. 
Because the military constitute a profession 
divorced from politics in open access societ-
ies, such deviations are less consequential 
and,  therefore,  less  unsettling.  Secondly, 
in  natural  societies,  politicians  intervene 
in markets in ways that generate opportu-
nities  for  rationing,  thereby  securing  the 
resources with which to grant favors and to 
build political followings. In contrast, open 
access  societies  are  based  on  market-like 
principles. Ideas compete for adherents and 
few barriers limit political entry. When hit 
by external shocks, then, open access societ-
ies are better positioned to adapt, with new 
leaders coming to the fore or old leaders 
championing new policies. 
2.  Discussion
In  addressing  these  arguments,  I  begin 
with North, Wallis, and Weingast’s discussion 
of the transition from natural to open access 
political systems and then turn to their analy-
sis of the latter.
2.1  The Transition
In analyzing the process of development, 
North, Wallis, and Weingast place appropri-
ate emphasis on the work of Charles Tilly, 
who famously declaimed that “states make 
war and war makes the state” (Tilly 1985). 
The  pursuit  of  international  security,  Tilly 
argues,  spurred  the  marginalization  of  the 
aristocracy, the rise of meritocracy, and the 
creation of a skilled bureaucracy. It also led 
to the search for public revenues, thus ren-
dering the state developmental.
Devised to account for the formation of 
states  in  the  Early  Modern  period,  Tilly’s 
argument applies to the modern era as well. 
Thus David C. Kang (2002), among others, 
highlights  the  signi cance  of  the  United 
States’ abandonment of its previous commit-
ments to Vietnam to account for the trans-
formation of the government of Korea from 
a corruption-ridden dictatorship to a devel-
opmental autocracy. And Neil Charlesworth, 
in  his  probing  study  of  India’s  economic 
stagnation, highlights the impact of its geo-
political setting: unlike states in Europe, he 
writes, India had no need “to industrialize in 
order  to  compete  with  neighboring  rivals” 
(Charlesworth 1982, p. 71). 
North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast  are  fully 
aware of the manner in which Tilly and oth-
ers relate international con ict to economic 
development but they fail, in my judgment, to 
fully assimilate the broader logic that under-
lies the argument. Political incumbents, Tilly 
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order to ensure their own political survival. 
The point applies to domestic as well as to 
international politics. Thus the logic that ties 
political  accountability  to  the  selection  of 
welfare  enhancing  public  policies  (Robert 
J. Barro 1973; John Ferejohn 1986; Persson 
and Guido Tabellini 2000). Relevant to this 
book’s agenda is that the logic of these mod-
els  has  been  applied  by  both  practitioners 
and scholars to the developing world. Thus 
the World Bank’s call for political reform to 
induce policy reform, particularly in Africa 
(World  Bank  1991).  Thus  too  the  work  of 
Macartan Humphreys and Robert H. Bates 
(2005), who  nd that governments, when sub-
ject to challenge in upcoming elections, are 
less likely to be viewed by investors as prone 
to  predation  and  Bates  (2008),  who   nds 
that,  when  forced  to  compete  for  votes  to 
stay in power, governments in Africa altered 
their economic policies, notably by abandon-
ing measures that imposed high costs on the 
rural sector (which contains the majority of 
the  electorate).  Rather  than  championing 
intersectoral  redistribution,  they  adopted 
“growth oriented” policies instead. 
There is thus reason to believe that chal-
lenges  to  the  political  security  of  political 
elites from within, like threats posed from 
without,  generate  incentives  for  them  to 
render  the  state  “developmental.”  Their 
argument  is  thus  more  general  and  more 
powerful than the authors realize.
2.2  Open Access Societies 
I  readily  af rm  the  accuracy  of  the 
authors’  portrait  of  the  developing  world, 
or at least the portion that is Africa. There 
politics  can  be  a  deadly  game  played  by 
the members of a small elite. Its members 
often  favor  policies  that  result  in  scarcity 
rather than abundance because such poli-
cies better provide the resources with which 
to  build  political  organizations.  Politicians 
accumulate  support  by  supplying  private 
bene ts—money  or  jobs—rather  than 
  public goods. Organizations are based upon 
personal  relationships—family  ties  or  per-
sonal  loyalties—rather  than  impersonal 
standards.  The  characteristics  that  North, 
Wallis, and Weingast emphasize thus apply 
and the consequences they adduce appear 
to follow: slow growth, as the result of fre-
quent economic collapses, often accompa-
nied—or precipitated—by violence.
I  nd myself less satis ed with the authors’ 
characterization  of  open  access  societies. 
The image they convey is classically liberal: 
it resonates with the writings of John Stuart 
Mill (2002) and Thomas H. Marshall (1950) 
and those of the modern pluralists, David B. 
Truman (1951) and Robert A. Dahl (1961). 
While  advancing  an  argument  that  bears 
striking parallels with the pluralist tradition, 
North, Wallis, and Weingast fail, in my judg-
ment, to pay suf cient heed to its critics.
North, Wallis, and Weingast posit a gov-
ernment  that  remains  vulnerable  to  entry: 
were it to respond to but a small set of privi-
leged interests, it would then become vul-
nerable to those who have been excluded. In 
the response to this danger, open access poli-
ties embrace public interests more broadly 
de ned.  While  plausible  in  principle,  his-
torically this line of reasoning has attracted 
a host of critics. Among the most prominent 
stands Mancur Olson (1971), who stressed 
that the politics of interest groups favored 
the “large” over the “small.” Pluralist politics, 
he  concluded,  is  therefore  biased.  Others 
argue that, rather than being open, pluralist 
systems are subject to political capture. Thus 
Theodore J. Lowi (1979), Grant McConnell 
(1966), and others (George J. Stigler 1971) 
point to features of American political insti-
tutions—the committee system in Congress, 
the weakness of political parties, and politi-
cal oversight by the bureaucracy—that make 
it easy for interest groups to mobilize public 
power for private advantage.
While the authors acknowledge the possi-
bility of such outcomes, they insist that the 755 Bates: A Review of   Violence and Social Orders
threat of entry provides a remedy. But inso-
far as this is the case, remedy is surely more 
likely to come from electoral rather than inter-
est group politics. Whether it be in the pro-
gressive era, the depression, or the present, 
when major political reform has taken place, 
it has tended to follow the electoral defeat of 
incumbents.  Thus  this  reader’s  disappoint-
ment with the author’s failure to incorporate 
electoral histories into their historical narra-
tives or  to incorporate  political parties into 
the ranks of their “perpetually lived” organi-
zations. Their political histories should have 
addressed not only legal rulings, focusing on 
corporations and  rms, but also critical elec-
tions, centering on parties and candidates. 
In their analysis of open access societies, 
the authors stress the importance of entry; 
in so doing, however, they slight the power 
of exit—a strategy that also yields political 
in uence. In the presence of openness, exit 
becomes  an  option  (Albert  O.  Hirschman 
1970; Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz 
1962;  Bates  and  Da-Hsiang  Donald  Lien 
1985).  When  devising  policies,  politicians 
must  bargain  over  the  incidence  of  their 
costs  and  bene ts.  Those  who  are  mobile 
are better positioned to negotiate than are 
those who are not; to elicit their agreement 
to share in the costs of public programs, poli-
ticians may have to give them a greater share 
of the bene ts. Thus the ability of footloose 
businesses  to  secure  favorable  tax  treat-
ment from states and  nancial capital to cow 
national governments. In a world in which 
markets  have  become  increasingly  global, 
openness assumes a greater role in shaping 
patterns of domestic political advantage.
A  last  reservation:  Violence  and  Social 
Orders  is  largely  devoted  to  characteriza-
tion  and  classi cation.  In  that  respect,  it 
resembles the classics of the  rst generation 
of development studies. I do not refer to the 
nineteenth  century  writings  of  Max  Weber 
(1968), Emile Durkheim (1933), or Karl Marx 
(1906), who sought to explain the rise of the 
West, but rather to the postwar writings of 
the   modernization theorists, such as Gabriel 
A. Almond (Almond and James S. Coleman 
1960), Neil J. Smelser (Talcott Parsons and 
Edward  A.  Shils  1951;  Smelser  1959),  or 
Parsons  (1951),  who  sought  to  address  the 
developing world today. As do North, Wallis, 
and Weingast, these scholars highlighted the 
distinctive features and dominant character-
istics of the societies they studied—they too 
created  typologies,  classifying  societies  as 
traditional  or  modern  and  generating  ideal 
types. As do North, Wallis, and Weingast, they 
appealed  to  the  notion  of  equilibrium  and 
insisted that the political and economic per-
formance of societies were affected by social 
institutions and cultural norms.
1 
Many of us who went on to study devel-
opment  set  these  works  aside,  dissatis ed 
by the absence of agency—a notion of the 
forces that might account for the patterns 
that they describe. Parsons, at least, recog-
nized this de ciency and, by way of remedy, 
formulated a “theory of action” (Parsons and 
Shils 1951); others turned to the notion of 
rationality in choice. Each author of Violence 
and Social Order has made major contribu-
tions to the latter literature. This reader, at 
least, is therefore surprised by the limited 
role that micro-level reasoning plays in their 
arguments.  I  wished  to  be  introduced  to 
active agents, be they politicians, merchants, 
farmers, or kinsmen. I wanted to be informed 
about  the  problems  they  faced,  the  con-
straints they encountered, the beliefs they 
entertained, and the strategies they devised. 
I needed to be enlightened about the context 
within which they operated, be it a market, a 
battle eld, an assembly, or a physical setting. 
Concepts, such as “double balance” or “door-
step conditions,” seemed disembodied and, 
therefore,  unable  to  provide  an  intuitively 
1 Which  included  “ascription”  and  “achievement,” 
paralleling North, Wallis, and Weingast’s “personal” and 
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satisfying or logically   compelling   explanation 
of why some societies have developed while 
others have failed to do so.
With bravado, abandon, and great learning, 
North, Wallis, and Weingast have produced 
an  excellent  read—a  book  that  is  intrigu-
ing, entertaining, irritating, and provocative. 
Violence and Social Orders is an important 
book  that  deserves  a  wide  readership.  Its 
concepts will shape academic discourse and 
its arguments the  elds of economic history 
and development studies.
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